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Communication for Expressivists*
Alejandro Pérez Carballo and Paolo Santorio
How can expressivists make sense of the practice of communication? If commu-
nication is not a joint enterprise aimed at sharing information about the world,
why do we engage in communication the way we do? Call this the problem of com-
munication. Starting from basic assumptions about the rationality of speakers and
the nature of assertion, we argue that speakers engaging in conversation about
normative matters must presuppose that there is a unique normative standard
on which the attitudes of conversational participants ought to converge. This
gives the beginning of a solution to the problem of communication on behalf of
expressivists.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to metaethical expressivists, moral statements do not aim at
describing the world. The function of moral talk is instead to express non-
representational mental states. As is well known, expressivists face the
challenge of giving a semantics for moral language that is compatible
with these claims—and the jury is still out on whether this challenge can
be met. In this article, we focus on a related but different question: How
can the expressivist account for the assertion and the uptake of normative
claims?
Suppose that Anne and Brad are discussing the permissibility of tax
evasion. Anne utters “Tax evasion is wrong.” She does this because she
has an intention to produce in Brad a certain attitude about tax evasion.
Upon hearing Anne’s utterance, Brad recognizes her intention and acts
accordingly: he either adopts the relevant attitude or challenges Anne’s
* Thanks to audiences at Harvard, MIT, the Australian National University, and the
University of Sydney; to two anonymous referees for Ethics ; as well as to the journal’s asso-
ciate editors for helpful comments and discussion. Special thanks to Fabrizio Cariani, John
MacFarlane, David Plunkett, Agustı́n Rayo, Bob Stalnaker, and Judy Thomson for feed-
back at many different stages of the project. Authors’ names are listed in alphabetical order.
607
Ethics 126 (April 2016): 607–635
© 2016 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/2016/12603-0003$10.00
This content downloaded from 129.011.023.082 on April 21, 2016 01:45:42 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
claim. All this has the semblance of a rational and purposeful activity.
Can the expressivist account for this intuition?
To see that the expressivist has a prima facie problem, consider how
an analogous question is answered for the case of uncontroversially de-
scriptive discourse. Suppose that Anne asserts that a common acquain-
tance, Tom, evaded taxes last year, and Brad comes to believe the corre-
sponding proposition. How can we explain Anne’s assertion and Brad’s
uptake of the relevant information? Answers may vary, but they will share
a common core. Anne makes her assertion because she thinks this is a
good way of imparting some relevant knowledge to Brad. Brad comes to
believe what Anne says because it promotes his goal of learning infor-
mation about the world. This simple explanation crucially appeals to
notions like truth, knowledge, and the actual world. But it is part of the
expressivist’s picture that, at least in an important sense, normative state-
ments are not truth-apt and don’t convey information about the world.
Some expressivists suggest that we engage in conversation about
normativematters to achieve a kind of coordination. This, they suggest, is
the goal of conversation about both normative and nonnormative mat-
ters: to get participants’ attitudes to align, whether those attitudes are
beliefs or attitudes of another kind. But even if this is right, it is far from
a complete account. If coordination was all we wanted out of conversa-
tion, our communicative practices would look very different. Flipping a
coin is a perfectly acceptable way to coordinate. But we don’t solve nor-
mative disagreements via coin flips or similar randomization strategies.
Hence speakers are not merely looking to coordinate when engaging in
normative talk. Somethingmore thanmere coordinationmust be at stake.
For the case of communication about nonnormative matters, truth can
be again invoked to the rescue. Speakers want to coordinate by having
their beliefs align with what things are actually like. But, again, the ex-
pressivist cannot appeal to truth in her account of normative talk.
In this article, we provide the beginning of an account of commu-
nication on behalf of the expressivist. We start from basic assumptions
about the rationality of speakers and about assertion. These assump-
tions, we argue, entail that speakers engaging in normative communi-
cation must assume that their claims are subject to a standard of cor-
rectness, similarly to descriptive claims. More precisely, this is our main
contention:
In any conversation where certain minimal assumptions are
satisfied, it is presupposed that there is a ðuniqueÞ normative
standard onwhich theparticipants’ attitudes ought to converge.
The ought here is a practical one. It concerns the rational requirements
that apply to agents, in view of their goal of taking part in communica-
608 Ethics April 2016
This content downloaded from 129.011.023.082 on April 21, 2016 01:45:42 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
tion. Our claim, then, is this: to successfully engage in communication,
speakers have to presuppose that they’re subject to a requirement to
converge on a joint standard that applies to them in virtue of their being
communicators. We explain the precise content of this requirement—
together with the ‘minimal assumptions’, the notion of a presupposition,
and the nature of the attitudes at stake—in the course of our discussion.
We should point out that we don’t aim at giving a full account of com-
munication on behalf of the expressivist. We take for granted certain
basic facts about assertion that an expressivist will need to explain further.
Throughout the article, we exploit a specific formal framework for
modeling communication, namely, the one proposed by Robert Stal-
naker and refined by many others. Our argument does not depend on
the specific formal features of Stalnaker’s framework. We use this frame-
work because it makes our argument clearer and more precise. But ulti-
mately our argument could be run independently of the overall frame-
work. All that we strictly need are two assumptions. The first is that to
make an assertion is to propose an update of certain belief-like attitudes
of the speakers. Hence, on this picture, communication is first and
foremost away of exchanging information ðbroadly construed, to include
also normative informationÞ. The second assumption is that the rele-
vant belief-like attitude should be understood in terms of Stalnaker’s no-
tion of acceptance, which we discuss below. We think these assumptions
are essentially correct: they capture what happens in the great majority
of ordinary conversations. ðIn fact, we think that the whole of Stalna-
ker’s framework provides a useful model of conversations between real
agents—although, like every model, it involves some level of idealiza-
tion.Þ Hence, while our argument is framed in formal terms and the
notions of assertion, communication, and conversation we use are tech-
nical, our conclusion is intended to apply to actual normative conversa-
tions between real agents.
II. BACKGROUND: EXPRESSIVISM AND COMMUNICATION
Throughout the article, we take expressivism about normative discourse
as our running example. Ultimately, we would want our conclusions to
apply to expressivism about a large variety of discourses. But different
varieties of expressivism call for tweaks and extensions of our claims.
Hence, for the purposes of this article, we set them aside.1
1. In particular, so-called expressivism about epistemic and probabilistic discourse
might require some substantial changes to the argument ðsee, among others, Seth Yalcin,
“Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality,” 295–334; Eric Swanson, “How Not to Theorize
about the Language of Subjective Uncertainty,” 249–69, both in Epistemic Modality, ed. Andy
Egan and Brian Weatherson ½Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011; Daniel Rothschild,
“Expressing Credences,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 ½2012: 99–114; Seth Yalcin,
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A. Expressivism
We start from a minimal conception of expressivism about normative
discourse, consisting of a negative and a positive claim:2
Minimal Expressivism
aÞ normative claims are not apt for describing, stating, or report-
ing facts;
bÞ normative claims express a noncognitive ðnonrepresentationalÞ
attitude of some sort.
Of course, to get a proper theory out of it, this minimal characterization
needs to be fleshed out. One needs to say more about, first, the nature of
the noncognitive attitudes in play and their role in a general philosophy
ofmind and, second, the expressivist’s semantics for normative discourse.
For present purposes, we work with the version of expressivism de-
veloped by Allan Gibbard in Wise Choices, Apt Feelings.3 Gibbard’s expres-
sivism has a number of virtues. It is a general theory of normative dis-
course; it yields a semantics that is compositional and fully compatible
with standard syntactic views; it yields a simple account of logical conse-
quence for normative discourse.4 Moreover, Gibbard’s semantics for nor-
mative discourse dovetails well with the framework for modeling com-
munication we will use, namely, the one developed by Robert Stalnaker.5
2. For a similar characterization, see Huw Price, “Expressivism for Two Voices,” in
Pragmatism, Science, and Naturalism, ed. Jonathan Knowles andHenrik Rydenfelt ðNew York:
Lang, 2011Þ, 87–114. Notice that we will reserve the term ‘expressivism’ for what Price calls
‘20th century expressivism’.
3. Allan Gibbard,Wise Choices, Apt Feelings: A Theory of Normative Judgment ðCambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1990Þ.
4. In particular, we take Gibbard’s semantics to have the best chances of overcoming
the notorious Frege-Geach problem. For the initial formulation of the problem, see P. T.
Geach, “Ascriptivism,” Philosophical Review 69 ð1960Þ: 221–25, and “Assertion,” Philosophi-
cal Review 74 ð1965Þ: 449–65. For an overview of the literature and discussion, see Mark
Schroeder, Noncognitivism in Ethics ðOxford: Routledge, 2010Þ, Being For: Evaluating the Se-
mantic Program of Expressivism ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2008Þ, and “How Expres-
sivists Can and Should Solve Their Problem with Negation,”Noûs 42 ð2008Þ: 573–99, among
many others. As we note below, there is still considerable skepticism that Gibbard’s picture
can provide a real solution to the problem.
5. Robert C. Stalnaker, “Assertion,” in Syntax and Semantics, ed. Peter Cole ðNew York:
Academic Press, 1978Þ, vol. 9, repr. in his Context and Content ðOxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999Þ, 315–22.
“Bayesian Expressivism,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 ½2012: 123–60Þ. It’s not clear
to us whether, on these accounts, the update of shared informationhappens via set-theoretic
intersection of some formal objects, as it happens for Gibbard, or whether they employ a
different update operation ðas it happens in the account given by Frank Veltman, “Defaults
in Update Semantics,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 ½1996: 221–61, which is an obvious
source of inspiration for these viewsÞ. Hence, it’s not clear to us whether these accounts can
be modeled as a generalization of the Stalnakerian model of assertion we adopt.
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B. Gibbard’s Norm-Expressivism
Gibbard’s account is formulated in terms of an attitude which he calls
‘accepting a norm’: this is the kind of attitude that determines what an
individual regards as mandated, permissible, or forbidden. Your judging
that cannibalism is wrong amounts to your accepting a norm that forbids
cannibalism; Tom’s judging that tax evasion is okay amounts to his ac-
cepting a norm that allows for tax evasion. Gibbard doesn’t define the
notion of accepting a norm: rather, he assumes that this attitude will be
part of a ðyet to comeÞ fully developed empirical psychology, on a par with
beliefs and desires, one that will play a central role in an evolutionary
explanation of individuals’ coordination in a social context.
One crucial part of Gibbard’s enterprise consists in specifying a for-
mal model for the contents of normative attitudes. To do this, Gibbard
employs complete systems of norms. Think of a complete system of norms n
simply as ðsomething that determinesÞ a three-way partition of possible
courses of action: those that are forbidden according to n, those that are
permitted but not required according to n, and those that are required
according to n. Complete systems of norms ðhenceforth, for short: normsÞ
play the same role in characterizing normative attitudes that possible
worlds play for nonnormative attitudes in possible worlds semantics. If
you believe that Tom is a cannibal, we characterize the content of your
belief state with worlds where ðamong other thingsÞ Tom eats human
flesh. Similarly, if you accept that cannibalism is wrong, Gibbard models
the content of your normative attitudes with a set of norms all of which
forbid ðamong other thingsÞ eating human flesh.
With this model of mental content in place, it is easy to formulate a
semantics for normative language that works in the usual recursive way.6
So far, we have assumed that descriptive attitudes make distinctions be-
tween possible worlds and that normative attitudes make distinctions be-
tween norms. But it is best to let all sentences in a language denote formal
entities of the same kind, for a number of reasons ðe.g., accounting for
‘mixed’ sentences like “If Tom eats people, he does something wrong”Þ.
So instead of assigning semantic values of different kinds to each frag-
ment of the language, we assign sets of world-norm pairs to each sentence.
Hence, the semantic values of
ð1Þ Tom is a cannibal.
ð2Þ Eating people is okay.
are given by, respectively:
6. Gibbard’s ownway of doing so yields the wrong results for attitude reports. But those
are wrinkles that can be easily ironed out; cf. James Dreier, “Transforming Expressivism,”
Noûs 33 ð1999Þ: 558–72, 571.
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ð3Þ fhw, ni: Tom is a cannibal in wg
ð4Þ fhw, ni: Eating people is permitted by ng
That said, we will proceed under the simplifying assumption that all purely
normative sentences get assigned a set of norms as semantic value. We
do this just to reduce clutter. But it’s easy to recover sets of world-norm
pairs from our semantic values: simply identify each set of norms A with
the set of world-norm pairs hw, ni such that n is in A.
Two final clarifications are in order. First, recent literature has raised
some foundational questions about Gibbard’s framework. The main worry
is that Gibbard cannot specify ðin a nonstipulative and noncircular wayÞ
what it is for two norms to be inconsistent. Here, we set this worry aside—
we assume that the problem can be solved one way or another.7 Second,
for the purposes of this article, we assume that formal objects like ð3Þ
and ð4Þ work both as the semantic values recursively assigned to ð1Þ and
ð2Þ and as the contents of utterances of ð1Þ and ð2Þ. There are good rea-
sons to think that this is a conflation,8 but one that is harmless for our
purposes.
C. Assertion, Communication, Common Ground
Throughout the article, we rely on a broadly Stalnakerian picture of com-
munication.9 On this picture, conversation takes place against a back-
ground body of information—the ‘common ground’. Roughly, the com-
mon ground represents what is commonly taken for granted for the
purposesof theconversation.Thepurposeof anassertion is toexpand this
shared stock of information. A successful utterance brings about that the
proposition uttered gets added to it.
We represent a body of information as a set of possible worlds—the
worlds that are compatible with that body of information. Following
Stalnaker, we call the set of worlds modeling the background informa-
7. Or perhaps that the problem turns out to be spurious on closer analysis. See Ale-
jandro Pérez Carballo, “Negation, Expressivism, and Intentionality” ðunpublished manu-
script, University of Massachusetts, Amherst, 2012Þ.
8. For discussion of this point, see David Lewis, “Index, Context, and Content,” in
Philosophy and Grammar, ed. Stig Kanger and Sven Öhman ðDordrecht: Reidel, 1980Þ, 21–
44, repr. in his Papers in Philosophical Logic ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998Þ,
79–100; Michael Dummett, Frege: Philosophy of Language, 2nd ed. ðCambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press, 1981Þ; Dilip Ninan, “Semantics and the Objects of Assertion,” Linguistics
and Philosophy 33 ð2010Þ: 355–80; Brian Rabern, “Against the Identification of Assertoric
Content with Compositional Value,” Synthese 189 ð2012Þ: 75–96.
9. See, e.g., Robert C. Stalnaker, “Presuppositions,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 2
ð1973Þ: 447–57, repr. in Context and Content, “Assertion,” “Common Ground,” Linguistics
and Philosophy 25 ð2002Þ: 701–21, and Context ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2014Þ; as
well as David Lewis, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8
ð1979Þ: 339–59.
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tion in a particular context the ‘context set’. We also think of the content
of a declarative utterance as a set of possible worlds—those worlds in
which the utterance is true. Finally, we model the effects of an assertion
on the context set as set-theoretic intersection: the effect on the context
set of an utterance whose content is modeled with a set S of possible
worlds is that of eliminating from the context set those worlds not in S.
Consider a simple example. Zoe and Yael are having a conversation
about Tom. They jointly assume a number of propositions about him—
for example, the proposition that Tom lives in Boston.Wemodel the con-
text set of their conversation as a set of worlds in which ðamong other
thingsÞ Tom lived in Boston. Now, suppose Yael utters the sentence “Tom
didn’t pay taxes last year.” If her assertion is successful, the context set
will now get updated with this new piece of information: hence, the new
context set contains only worlds where Tom lives in Boston and didn’t pay
taxes last year.
We can specify what it is for some information to be “commonly
taken for granted” in more detail. First, we need to introduce the notion
that Stalnaker dubs ‘acceptance’.10 This notion is entirely distinct from
Gibbard’s notion of accepting a norm; the terminological similarity is
just an unfortunate coincidence ðwe worry about how to deal with this
belowÞ. Acceptance is, quite simply, the attitude of taking a proposition
for granted for the purposes of a conversation.
In at least some cases, acceptance diverges in interesting ways from
belief. Consider this example:
Smith and Jones find themselves in a conversation. They both
believe ðsuppose, trulyÞ that, many years ago, Smith tried to
steal money from Jones in a moment of desperation; moreover,
they both believe that they believe this, and believe that they
believe that, and so on. In short, that proposition is the object
of common belief between them. However, they both prefer
avoiding to acknowledge that proposition. So, for the purposes
of the conversation, they behave as if they did not believe this
proposition.
That Smith once tried to steal money from Jones is not accepted and is
not validated by the context set of their conversation. Notice that accep-
tance has a peculiar ‘transparent’ nature: if an agent represents herself
as accepting p, then, as a matter of fact, she does accept p for the pur-
poses of the conversation. One cannot lie about one’s acceptances. The
transparent nature of acceptance will play a crucial role for us.
10. Stalnaker, “Common Ground.”
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The contents of the common ground are defined on the basis of
acceptance. In particular, the common ground will be identical with what
is commonly believed to be accepted in a conversation. Common belief
is an iterated notion of belief: it is common belief that p just in case all
the members of the conversation believe that p, all believe that they be-
lieve that p, and so on. So, in summary:11
It is common ground that p in a group if and only if all members
accept ðfor the purpose of the conversationÞ that p, and all
believe that all accept that p, and all believe that all believe that
all accept that p, and so on.
The context set is just the set of worlds that validate all and only the
propositions that are common ground.
Using similar tools, we can also define a notion of speaker presup-
position. Differently from common belief, presupposition is an individ-
ual attitude. Each speaker enters a conversation with her own presup-
positions. Roughly, a presupposition is a proposition that the speaker
takes for granted in the course of the conversation. We can capture this
pretty simply with the current apparatus by identifying the presupposi-
tion that p with the belief that it is common ground in the conversation
that p :
Speaker S presupposes that p in a conversation if and only if S
believes that it is common ground among participants in the
conversation that p.
For the purposes of our argument, we often take presupposition, much
more simply, as mutual acceptance. But we revert to the more precise
notion where it matters.
Gibbard-style expressivists can take on board this general picture of
communication. There is a terminological complication, however. The
notions of acceptance, common ground, and presupposition have been
introduced in a truth-conditional framework. Hence, these notions con-
cern descriptive contents. We would need to introduce new terminology
to capture counterparts of them that also apply to normative contents.
11. Here we go along with the notion of common ground from Stalnaker, “Common
Ground,” 716: “Themore general notion of common ground should not be just an iterated
version of a broader notion of acceptance. Successful communication is compatible with
presuppositions that are recognized to be false, but the information that they are being
presupposed must be actually available, and not just assumed or pretended to be available.
Even the liar, if he really intends to communicate, has to believe that the information
needed to interpret his lies will really be common ground.” In recent work Stalnaker reverts
to a picture of common ground that uses just iterated acceptance—see Stalnaker, Context.
Going along with this alternative picture would make no difference for our purposes.
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But this would involve a lot of clutter, so we’ll take a shortcut. We are
going to understand the standard vocabulary of theories of assertion and
communication in a broader, nonstandard way. We take a proposition to
be modeled either by a set of worlds or by a set of norms.12 We use ‘be-
lief ’ to pick out both descriptive beliefs and attitudes of accepting a
norm in Gibbard’s sense. Hence, we’ll talk about a subject believing that
ðsayÞ tax evasion is wrong, while still understanding this attitude in a
noncognitivist way. We will make an analogous move for acceptance and
presupposition.13
We can now summarize our Stalnakerian picture of conversation, ap-
propriately enlarged to encompass also Gibbardian contents. In conver-
sation, speakers try to influence what others accept—where to accept that
p is to act as if one believes that p. The contents of the speaker’s mental
states can now be modeled using sets of world-norm pairs. Hence, the
possibilities that are part of the common ground are different from
those we find in the descriptivist model. But all the rest of the apparatus
remains the same. In particular, we still model the common ground as
ðroughlyÞ the set of possibilities ðnormsÞ that are left open by speakers’
attitudes, and we still model the effect of an assertion on the context set
by intersecting it with the semantic value of the sentence asserted.
Before proceeding, let us address an objection. One might worry
that the common ground model is incompatible with Gibbard’s norm
expressivism.14 The notion of assertion, the objection goes, is closely con-
nected to notions like truth and knowledge, which belong in a factualist
picture of language.15 Perhaps there are no formal obstacles to extend-
ing Stalnaker’s formalism to Gibbardian contents. But doing so involves
dropping some of themain philosophical commitments of expressivism.
We grant that there is a construal of assertion on which it bears sub-
stantial, perhaps conceptually necessary, connections to truth and knowl-
edge. But here we rely on a ‘thinner’ construal of assertion. We under-
stand assertion as the speech act whose functional role is to update the
commonground in a certainway—inparticular, assertion is the speechact
that updates the common ground by intersection. Given our expressivist-
friendly understanding of acceptance, and the plausible claim that utter-
ances of declarative normative sentences canupdate speakers’ acceptances,
the expressivist is entitled to characterize utterances of declarative nor-
mative sentences as assertions in this sense.
12. In full generality: a set of world-norm pairs.
13. For discussion of this and related terminological issues, see Schroeder, Noncog-
nitivism in Ethics, 85ff.
14. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing us to consider this and related issues.
15. For some classical accounts vindicating these connections, see Michael Dummett,
“Truth,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 ð1959Þ: 141–62; and Timothy Williamson,
“Knowing and Asserting,” Philosophical Review 105 ð1996Þ: 489–523.
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Notice that this explication of assertion makes no appeal to notions
like truth and knowledge. Instead, the thin construal we use ties asser-
tion to linguistic form. In general, assertions are the speech acts that are
performed by declarative sentences. We say ‘in general’ because not all
utterances of declarative sentences will do: sometimes we can utter a de-
clarative sentence with no intention to produce a speech act ðe.g., just
to practice our pronunciationÞ. Assertions are the speech acts that are
performed via those utterances of declarative sentences that are intended
to update the common ground.
D. Issues
In any conversation, there are a number of questions that are of mutual
interest to the participants in the conversation. These questions can be
used to define a notion of relevance: a proposition is relevant in a context
c if and only if it does not say more than what is needed to answer all of
the questions. And, more important, they can be used to provide a less
idealized characterization of the common ground.16
If we model the possibilities compatible with the common ground
with a set of worlds ðthe context setÞ, we can model each question of
interest—or ‘question under discussion’—as a partition of this set: a col-
lection of subsets of the context set that are pairwise disjoint and jointly
exhaustive. Two worlds are in the same set if and only if they agree on the
complete answer to the question.17
For illustration, suppose that Yael and Zoe are having a conversa-
tion with three questions under discussion: whether Tom paid taxes last
year, whether he concealed anything from the IRS, and whether he is
going to be audited. Figure 1 is a representation of the partitions cor-
responding to each of these questions. Given a set of questions under
discussion, we can define a unique partition, which groups together
worlds that agree on the answer to all the questions under discussion.18
In figure 1, the partition is composed of those regions that are not di-
vided by any of the lines.
16. Compare Joris Hulstijn, “Structured Information States: Raising and Resolving
Issues,” in Proceedings of MunDial ’97, ed. Anton Benz and Gerhard Jäger ðMunich: Centrum
für Informations- und Sprachverarbeitung, 1997Þ, 99–117; and Craige Roberts, “Informa-
tion Structure in Discourse: Towards an Integrated Formal Theory of Pragmatics,” Seman-
tics and Pragmatics 5 ð2012Þ: 1–69.
17. Compare C. L. Hamblin, “Questions,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 ð1958Þ:
159–68, and “Questions in Montague English,” Foundations of Language 10 ð1973Þ: 41–53;
Jeroen Groenendijk and Martin Stokhof, “Studies in the Semantics of Questions and the
Pragmatics of Answers” ðPhD diss., University of Amsterdam, 1984Þ; David Lewis, “State-
ments Partly about Observation,” repr. in his Papers in Philosophical Logic, 1–31, inter alia.
18. More precisely: this is the coarsest partition that is a refinement of all the ques-
tions under discussion.
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On this picture, the goal of conversational participants is no longer
to locate the actual world within logical space but ðmore modestlyÞ to
individuate the true answers to all of the questions under discussion.
This is equivalent to ruling out all the cells in the partition, aside from
the one that contains the actual world. For example, suppose that Tom
has indeed paid taxes, did not conceal anything from the IRS, but will
nonetheless be audited. Then Yael and Zoe’s goals are accomplished
when all cells other than the bottom left L-shaped cell are ruled out.19
Oncewe track questions under discussion, the possibilities thatmake
up the common ground can be thought of not as possible worlds but as
cells of the partition induced by the questions under discussion. Follow-
ing Leonard Savage’s terminology, we can call these cells ‘small worlds’
ðthey are called ‘small’ because they contain strictly less information than
full-blown possible worldsÞ.20 Small worlds are different from possible
FIG. 1.—Yael and Zoe’s conversation partitions
19. This modification of the common ground framework is very much in the spirit of
the original proposal. As Stalnaker puts it: “The alternative possibilities used to define
propositions must be exclusive alternatives which are maximally specific, relative to the
distinctions that might be made in the context at hand. . . . One might think of possible
worlds as something like the elements of a partition of a space, rather than as the points
of the space. The space might be partitioned differently in different contexts, and there
might be no maximally fine partition” ðRobert C. Stalnaker, “Indexical Belief,” Synthese 49
½1981: 129–51, 136Þ.
20. Leonard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics, 2nd ed. ðNew York: Dover, 1972Þ.
See also James M. Joyce, The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory ðNew York: Cambridge
University Press, 1999Þ, for recent discussion.
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worlds, but the common ground model works exactly in the same way,
whether we use the one or the other. In both cases, assertion works by
ruling out open possibilities.
In what follows, we take small worlds to be the basic units of the
context set. What small worlds are in play is a function of context: we as-
sume that, for each context, there are a number of questions under dis-
cussion that induce a partition of the context set into small worlds. Fur-
ther questions under discussion might be added in the course of the
conversation, both explicitly ði.e., by uttering an interrogative sentenceÞ
or implicitly.21 But whether an issue becomes a question under discus-
sion ultimately depends, on our view, on whether all speakers intend to
settle that question in conversation:
The set of questions under discussion in a conversation is the
set of questions Q such that, for each Q , all speakers intend to
engage in inquiry to settle whether Q.
In short: the live questions are those that speakers intend to discuss.22 As
we said above, the questions under discussion in a conversation gener-
ate the small worlds in the context set. Hence, for each small world in
the conversation, all speakers involved are willing to take up the ques-
tion whether that particular small world in the conversation should be
ruled out.
All considerations that we’ve just made can be reproduced, mutatis
mutandis, for Gibbardian norms. We assume that the context set in con-
versations about normative matters consists of ‘small norms’—sets of com-
plete systems of norms that are grouped according to how to settle all
normative questions under discussion.
21. Note that implicitly raising an issue need not automatically result in a modifica-
tion of the set of questions under discussion. Suppose you have a conservative uncle who
often makes in-passing claims that are off topic and which presuppose some of his views
about ðsayÞ abortion. In conversation about different topics, you may want to avoid point-
less confrontation and you choose not to pick up on these remarks. In these cases, the
question whether abortion is permissible has no effect on the common ground. Thanks
here to an anonymous referee, to whom we also owe the example of the reactionary uncle.
22. This characterization has a variant worth considering:
The set of questions under discussion in a conversation is the set of questions
Q such that, for each Q , all speakers intend to engage in inquiry to settle
whether Q , and all speakers believe that they intend to engage in inquiry to
settle whether Q , and they believe that they believe it, etc.
The difference between these two characterizations is irrelevant for our purposes, so we
stick to the simpler one.
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Even though we take small worlds as the basic units of the context
set, to avoid clutter we keep using the simple terms ‘world’ and ‘possi-
bility’. Most of what we say holds for both small worlds and full-blown
possible worlds. But we will remind you of the explicit assumption that
small worlds are the ones in play in places where it matters. Similarly, we
will just talk about norms. As a result, when we say that conversation
about normative matters involves distinguishing among complete sys-
tems of norms, we should be understood to mean ‘complete only to the
extent required by the purposes of the conversation’. We will remind
you of the explicit assumption that small norms are the ones in play in
places where it matters.
III. THE PROBLEM
We established that expressivists can borrow from descriptivists a formal
framework for modeling content, assertion, and communication. But
the formal framework leaves one important question unaddressed. Ex-
pressivists should be able to make sense of the practice of conversation.
They need to explain why it’s reasonable for a speaker to have certain
expectations about the uptake of what she says and why it’s reasonable
for a hearer to actually take up what the speaker says.
In the descriptivist version of our model of communication, the ex-
planation goes as follows. Communication is a self-locating enterprise.
Speakers aim to find out what portion of logical space they occupy. Ex-
changing information is just a way of jointly narrowing down the set of
candidates for the actual world. But the expressivist can’t help herself to
a normative counterpart of the actual world. It is a basic assumption of
her view that there is no such thing. Hence, the expressivist owes us a
story about the point of engaging in communication about normative
matters, one that she can’t simply extract from the model of communi-
cation she’s borrowing.
Expressivists have gestured toward a way of making sense of commu-
nication that generalizes to descriptive and normative discourse alike.
The idea is to think of communication primarily as an exercise in co-
ordination. We are social creatures: we engage in conversation because
coordinating on some particular family of attitudes—beliefs, say, or norm
acceptances—is likely to help us meet our goals. Here is Gibbard explic-
itly making this point:23 “The biological function of the mechanisms un-
derlying our normative capacities is to coordinate. Hence the psychic
23. Seth Yalcin, who endorses an expressivist account of epistemic modal talk, makes
a proposal along similar lines—cf. Yalcin, “Nonfactualism about Epistemic Modality,” 310.
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mechanisms that produce normative judgments are not systems of nat-
ural representations, they are coordinating systems. Their biological func-
tion is not to put something in the head in correspondence with their
subject matter; it is to coordinate what is in one person’s head with what is
in another’s.”24 To a first approximation, this seems like a good strategy.
The point of engaging in conversation about nonnormative matters is to
coordinate on a body of beliefs. The point of engaging in conversation
about normative matters is to coordinate on a system of norms. We work
out, as a community, what to think about the world. We work out, as a
community, what system of norms to accept. Communication can be un-
derstood as a way to foster such coordination.
Unfortunately, this is far from a full account. There are many ways
of achieving coordination that differ from communication in crucial
ways. A newly established community might coordinate on what side of
the road to drive on via a random procedure like flipping a coin. This is a
perfectly acceptable way of achieving coordination. But we don’t rely on
coin flips when working out what to do, no more so than we rely on coin
flips when working out what the world is like. So saying that communi-
cation is a kind of coordination is just the beginning of an account. The
expressivist stills owes an account of exactly what kind of coordination
this is and what constraints apply to it.
One natural thought is that, when picking a side of the road to drive
on, all we want is that we all drive on the same side of the road. None of
us cares which side that is. Perhaps the case of communication is differ-
ent because agents approach communication with a number of initial
beliefs ðnormative or notÞ. Apart from jointly coordinating on a sector of
logical and normative space, they care about making it the case that this
sector not be disjoint from the sector that is already individuated by
their initial attitudes. In other terms, agents care about maximizing the
extent to which their initial views are preserved after communication.
There is something right about this suggestion, but it also falls far
short of an account. If communication functioned this way, it would be
mostly an exercise in bargaining. In other words, communicating would
be about proposing compromises that have a high enough payoff for all
agents involved. Of course, we can and do engage in bargaining of this
sort. Suppose that you and a friend care about spending the evening
together but have conflicting preferences. In that situation, it would not
do to just flip a coin to settle each detail of your plan. There would be
some give and take: you eat at the diner rather than the fancy restaurant,
as per your own preferences, but you go to the opera rather than the
roller derby, as per your friend’s. But this is not what we do when we
discuss descriptive and normative matters. Then we try to reach a set of
24. Gibbard, Wise Choices, 110.
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shared attitudes by giving reasons to each other. The idea that we could
compromise by just trading up some of our beliefs and acceptances for
agreement is out of place.25
Thus, we grant that coordination should play a part in a general ac-
count of communication. But a desire for coordination on our beliefs or
our normative acceptances cannot explain the complexities of our com-
municative practices. The expressivist needs more to get a full account.
IV. EXPLAINING COMMUNICATION
We now try to spell out what extra element needs to be in place in nor-
mative conversations, apart from an intention to coordinate. We argue
that this extra element can be extracted from some general assumptions
that speakers need to make in order to engage in conversation.
We start by examining the assumptions agents need tomake in order
to purposefully and rationally engage in communication about norma-
tive matters. We argue that, to do this, agents must take for granted that
there is a kind of objectivity about normative matters. As a result, in each
context, speakers presuppose that they are required to converge on a
unique norm, at least insofar as they choose to remain engaged in com-
munication. This will explain why our practice of communicating and
debating normative claims is analogous to our practice of communicat-
ing and debating nonnormative claims. In normal conversations, speak-
ers presuppose that there is an actual world: hence, they presuppose that
there is a point in the context set to which, at least ideally, their beliefs
about the world should converge. Similarly, we claim that they jointly
presuppose that there is an ‘actual’ norm—a norm to which, at least
ideally, their beliefs about normative matters ought to converge.
A. The Claim: Convergence
Let us start by introducing a bit of formalism. We use n and s as variables
ranging over systems of norms and speakers, respectively. ðMore pre-
cisely, n should be understood as ranging over systems of norms that are
complete only to the extent required by the purposes of the conversa-
tion.Þ We use ‘Accs’ to denote the set of systems of norms compatible
with what s accepts, and we use ‘Accs’ as an ‘acceptance’ operator, say-
ing that the embedded proposition is accepted by s. We can formulate
our main conclusion as follows:26
25. Incidentally, this observation also shows that the expressivist’s acceptances, al-
though they are a conative attitude of some sort, cannot be construed too closely on the
model of preferences. We take it that this is also one of the main lessons of Cian Dorr,
“Non-cognitivism and Wishful Thinking,” Noûs 36 ð2002Þ: 97–103—although, unlike Dorr,
we don’t take this disanalogy to doom expressivism.
26. Henceforth, we drop the qualifier ‘normal’ for the sake of readability.
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convergence. The following claim is common ground in any
conversation:
ð∃nÞð∀sÞ Ought ðfng5 AccsÞ:
We argue that convergence follows—surprisingly, perhaps—from some
minimal assumptions about the rationality of agents engaging in com-
munication and our practice of assertion.27
Let us say a bit more about the nature of the ought figuring in con-
vergence. This ought is supposed to capture norms regulating commu-
nication between rational agents: that is, norms that specify what a ratio-
nal agent who has the goal of engaging in a communicative exchange
ought to do. Hence, it is an ought of practical, as opposed to epistemic,
normativity.28 A rough gloss of ‘A ought to J’ would go like this: in view of
the requirements of practical rationality applying to her qua agent in-
volved in a communicative exchange, A ought to J. So far as we can see,
the normative force attaching to this ought is the same as that of Grice’s
Cooperative Principle:
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at
the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direc-
tion of the talk exchange in which you are engaged.29
Grice claims that anyone who cares about the central goal of commu-
nication is rationally required, in light of her own goals as a communi-
cator, to make her conversational contribution adequate in certain ways.
Similarly, we claim that, in a normal conversation, speakers presuppose
that there is a unique norm such that they are rationally required, in
light of their own goals as communicators, to have their attitudes con-
verge on that norm.
27. Notice that convergence does not amount to a capitulation to a form of realism.
A realist will presumably think that there is a unique norm ðthe ‘true’ normÞ to which, in
any ‘normal’ conversation, participants’ acceptances ought to converge. She may even
think that there is a unique norm such that, in any ‘normal’ conversation, it is common
ground that the participants’ acceptances ought to converge to that norm. But neither of
these claims is entailed by convergence.
28. There are traditional worries about the idea that practical normativity may apply to
an agent’s cognitive states. These worries are connected to skepticism about the possibil-
ity of doxastic control. But these worries should not apply to a notion of acceptance ðsee
belowÞ. Acceptances are propositions that agents choose to take for granted for the pur-
poses of the conversation. Agents may not be able to decide what to believe, but they’re able
to decide what to accept in a conversation.
29. H. P. Grice, “Logic and Conversation,” in Syntax and Semantics, vol. 3, Speech Acts,
ed. Peter Cole and Jerry Morgan ðNew York: Academic Press, 1975Þ, 41–58, 45, repr. in his
Studies in the Way of Words ðCambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989Þ, 22–40, 26.
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Before moving on, we should emphasize again that ‘norm’ in con-
vergence is short for ‘small norm’ ði.e., a set of norms that is a cell of
the partition generated by questions under discussionÞ. Hence, con-
vergence amounts to the requirement that, in ‘normal’ conversations,
speakers presuppose that there is a unique answer to all questions under
discussion such that they ought to converge on that answer. This falls
short of a presupposition that there is a fully specifiednormative standard
that agents ought to converge on, but it still is a substantial step toward
endorsing a kind of presupposition of objectivity in normative conversa-
tions. Beyond being a step in the direction of objectivity, this arguably
establishes a full parallel with conversations about nonnormativematters.
Also in that case, speakers presuppose that there is a unique ‘small world’
ðthe one containing the actual worldÞ to which their acceptances ought
to converge. Plausibly, in real conversations they do not presuppose that
there is a unique, maximally specific, possible world to which their ac-
ceptances ought to converge. Such a presupposition would presumably
be in conflict with Gricean assumptions about relevance. Questions un-
der discussion are all that is relevant in a conversation, and speakers have
no interest in irrelevant information.30
B. Not Anything Goes
Our argument for convergence begins by establishing a weaker claim.
In intuitive terms, this claim is that, in normative conversation, it is com-
mon ground that there is the possibility of a mistake—that is, it is com-
mon ground that, by participating in normative conversations and rul-
ing out normative possibilities in accordance with what is said, speakers
might rule out a normative possibility they ought not rule out. This claim
can be formalized as follows:
can go wrong. The following claim is common ground in any
conversation:
ð∃nÞð∀sÞ Ought ðn ∈ AccsÞ:
This premise can be regarded as a minimal requirement of objectivity: it
must be common ground that at least one of the normative possibilities
that speakers regard as open ought not be ruled out.
Notice that this is much weaker than the claim that speakers’ atti-
tudes should converge on a unique norm. It only requires that they keep
regarding one of the possibilities as open ði.e., that they not be allowed
to accept normative propositions incompatible with itÞ.
30. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing us to consider the apparent conflict
between convergence and the maxim of relevance.
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Our argument for can go wrong is somewhat involved. The basic
point, however, can be stated quickly and informally. Consider a conver-
sation between two agents, A and B, satisfying the following description:
The ‘anything goes’ situation. A accepts that there is no norm such
that A ought not rule out that norm. In other words, the fol-
lowing claim is the case, according to A:
:∃n Ought ðn ∈ AccAÞ:
We claim that, in the ‘anything goes’ situation, it would be pointless for B
to engage in conversation with A.
It helps to consider an example. Suppose A and B have narrowed
down the common ground to a set of two norms ðby which, once more,
we mean two cells in the partition determined by their questions under
discussionÞ. On one of these norms cannibalism is wrong, while on the
other it is okay. And now, suppose that A and B are indeed in an ‘any-
thing goes’ situation, so that, according to A, she is allowed to accept that
cannibalism is wrong or to accept that cannibalism is not wrong. B might
then say ðfor exampleÞ “Cannibalism is wrong.” A can agree that there’s
nothing wrong at all with B’s saying or thinking that—she would not be
willing to say that B said anything she ought not have said. Further, A
could agree that there is no reason for A not to accept B’s answer—she
takes herself to be allowed to rule out the norm according to which can-
nibalism is okay. And yet, she may stick to her belief that cannibalism is
okay, since she also takes herself to be allowed to rule out the norm ac-
cording to which cannibalism is wrong.
We claim that, in this kind of situation, it would make no sense for B
to engage in conversation with A. ðOr at least: it would make no sense for
B to engage with A in a conversation as long as the question whether
cannibalism is wrong is a question under discussion. We get back to this
shortly.Þ There would be no point to it. Hence, if B agrees to engage in
communication with A, she must do so under the assumption that A
doesn’t take herself to be in the ‘anything goes’ situation.
Let us clarify and generalize the foregoing.
First, let us highlight the basic theoretical point brought out by the
example. Suppose B takes a question Q to be a question under discus-
sion. Then, we claim, this entails that B is accepting that A accepts that
there is an ‘objective’ answer to Q—that is, that B is accepting that A
accepts that there is an answer to Q that she ought to accept. In other
words, questions under discussion are ðamong other thingsÞ questions
that we take to have an answer that we ought to endorse. We cannot take
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a question to be a question under discussion and at the same time think
we may accept either answer to it.31
Second, our example concerns a simple case in which there is only
one question under discussion. But the point generalizes. In every con-
versation, there is a set of questions under discussion fQ 1, Q 2, Q 3, . . . g.32
The norms that are in the context set correspond to conjunctions of
answers to all these questions. Now, suppose that, according to A, it is not
the case that there is a norm A ought to accept. Then there is at least one
question under discussion Qi such that, according to B, it would make
no sense for her to attempt to answer that question.
Third, as we hinted at already, the issue of whether it makes sense
for a speaker B to engage in conversation with A should be relativized to
what questions are under discussion. To see the point, it helps to con-
sider the following objection.33 Suppose we have three ðmutually exclu-
sive and jointly exhaustiveÞ small norms: n1, n2, and n3. For vividness, let
these norms concern three ethical stances about diet: n1 allows omni-
vorism, n 2 mandates vegetarianism, n3 mandates veganism. Now, sup-
pose that Alice and Bob are discussing the ethics of dietary choices. Alice
feels strongly about n1; it’s important to her that n1 be ruled out. But she
thinks that nothing settles whether one should adopt n 2 or n 3. In her
view, ethical rules ‘run out’ before settling which of n 2 or n 3 is right. In
this case, one might worry, the context set of the conversation between
Alice and Bob fits our characterization of the ‘anything goes’ situation,
since it is not the case that there is one particular norm that Alice ought
not rule out. Yet Alice does not take herself to be allowed to accept any
answer whatsoever to the questions under discussion. In this case, the
worry goes, it might still make sense for Bob to engage in conversation
with Alice, despite the fact that we are in an ‘anything goes’ scenario.
We agree with the objector that, in the case described, it makes
sense for Bob to engage in conversation with Alice. But we deny that the
31. Strictly speaking, our example shows something slightly weaker. It shows that, by
attempting to settle one of the questions under discussion, B is ruling out the possibility
that A takes it to be permissible to adopt either answer. But, one might object, maybe
there are questions that we take to be under discussion but that we assume will never be
settled. Won’t our claim fail in this case? We think that this case can be safely ignored. In
taking Q to be a question under discussion, one acts as if one believes one will get to
address it. Much like in placing an item on the agenda one is acting as if one believes one
will get to it during a meeting, even if one believes one may not get to it, in taking Q to be
a question under discussion one is acting as if one of the participants in the conversation
will attempt to answer Q.
32. For simplicity, we will assume that all questions under discussion are simple yes-
no questions. Nothing in our argument hinges on this.
33. Thanks to an anonymous referee for pushing us to consider this case.
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questions under discussion are the ones they describe. If Alice really
thinks that norms ‘run out’ before settling whether n 2 or n 3 is right, then
the relevant question under discussion in the conversation is not which
of n 1, n 2, or n 3 to adopt. Rather, the relevant question is which of n1 or ðn 2
or n 3Þ is right. Recall from Section II.D : a question is under discussion
just in case all speakers intend to engage in inquiry to settle it. But Alice
does not intend to engage in inquiry to settle whether n 2 or n 3 is correct.
She thinks ethical rules ‘run out’ before deciding which is correct. So
the subquestion whether n 2 or n 3 is right is not on the agenda of the
conversation.34
Let us recap our basic point. A and B are in conversation. In the
background, there are a number of questions they intend to discuss. B
makes a claim that amounts to an answer to one of those questions—say,
“Omnivorism is ethically forbidden.”35 For B’s speech act to make sense,
she must think that ðaÞ it is under discussion whether omnivorism is
wrong and ðbÞ A doesn’t think that she may accept either answer to the
question whether omnivorism is forbidden. This will be our starting point
in developing the rest of our argument.
Before moving on, let us make a final clarification. We are not claim-
ing that, whenever an agent is in an ‘anything goes’ situation, it makes
no sense to try to coordinate with her. Consider other instances of coor-
dination, like choosing which side of the road to drive on. This case
arguably does display the permissibility that we want to deny for the case
of communication. Neither agent has a reason to pick one side rather
than another, and they take this to be so. Yet it still makes sense for them
to make proposals about how to coordinate. So there is a point to coor-
dinating activities even when agents take themselves not to be subject to
any normative constraints.
What we are claiming is instead this: in an ‘anything goes’ situation,
coordination may not proceed via assertions of declarative sentences. An
‘anything goes’ situation allows for a gap between recognizing that a
proposal to coordinate is legitimate and accepting that proposal. Our
practice of making and accepting assertions doesn’t recognize this gap.
To see the point, contrast the following two conversations:
A: I suggest that we drive on the right-hand side of the road.
B: Nah, no way.
34. Of course, Alice can, for the sake of the argument, act as if she thinks that ethical
rules do settle whether n2 or n3 is correct. In this case, she will intend to engage in inquiry
to settle whether n2 or n3 is correct, at least for the purposes of the conversation, and it
makes sense to engage with Alice in conversation about the issue.
35. Or perhaps something weaker, i.e., a disjunction of answers to one or more
questions.
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C: The Brits drive on the left-hand side of the road.
D: Nah, no way.
Both B and D are rejecting what their interlocutor said. But notice a
crucial difference. By rejecting A’s utterance, B is not taking issue with
the appropriateness of A’s speech act. B can ðand normally willÞ deem A’s
speech act perfectly successful; B needs find no fault with A’s advancing
the suggestion that they drive on the right. This is fully compatible with
not accepting that suggestion. ðAnother way to see this—notice that B
could express his rejection as: “Okay, you’ve made a perfectly fine sug-
gestion. But I refuse to accept it.”Þ But the situation is different for the
case of C and D. D’s rejection amounts to a rejection of C ’s speech act. D
cannot think that there is nothing wrong with C ’s speech act and at the
same time think it’s okay not to update her belief as suggested by C.
ðNotice the awkwardness of saying: “Okay, you’ve made a perfectly fine
assertion. But I refuse to accept it.”Þ For the case of assertion, there is no
gap between finding an assertion appropriate and taking up the content
of that assertion.
Notice that we are assuming ðon the basis of simple empirical ob-
servationÞ that assertions of moral claims work in this way.36 This is one
of the starting points of our argument. We are not trying to explain, on
behalf of the expressivist, why this is so. Thus we’re not trying to give a
full account of communication on behalf of the expressivist. What we’re
doing is part of this enterprise, but we must leave the completion of the
task to a different occasion.37
In summary: while coordination is possible ðand indeed it does of-
ten happenÞ in an ‘anything goes’ situation, in such a situation it would
make little sense to attempt coordination by way of utterances of declar-
ative sentences.
36. Remember that we are using ‘assertion’ in the thin sense: our assumption is thus
that this is the way utterances of declarative sentences work, at least in ‘normal’ cases.
37. Let us just briefly flag a natural direction the expressivist might go to answer this
challenge. She might argue that the speech act of assertion is connected to epistemic
practices requiring us to provide shared reasons for backing assertions or for rejecting
them. This idea connects with a pretty different line of thinking about assertion than the
one we’re using, namely, the one developed in Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit ðCam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994Þ. We think that, in principle at least, these lines
of thinking may be reconciled; they seem to investigate different and complementary
aspects of assertion. Roughly: Stalnaker’s account focuses on the informational aspect of
assertion and on how assertions affects the speakers’ mental states in conversation; a
Brandomian theory of assertion spells out the epistemic norms that govern the practice of
assertion.
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C. Establishing CAN GO WRONG
We have argued that, for it to make sense for B to engage in conversation
with A, B must accept that A is not in an ‘anything goes’ situation:
:AccBðAccA∀nðMayðn ∉ AccAÞÞ:
We now claim that this is enough to establish the following claim:
AccBAccAð∃n Ought ðn ∈ AccAÞÞ: ðA0Þ
In plain English, this says that B accepts that A accepts that there is a
norm A ought not rule out.38 Notice that ðA0Þ says that B presupposes a
descriptive proposition about A’s attitudes, namely, the proposition that
A accepts that there is one norm that she is not allowed to rule out.
Of course, it is not in general true that if B must not believe that p,
B must therefore believe that :p. We argued that if B is convinced that,
according to A, anything goes for her, then it makes no sense for her to
engage in communication. But, wouldn’t it be enough for B to leave
open the possibility that A takes herself to be subject to some constraints
in what she accepts? Why think that ðA0Þ is required for it to make sense
for B to engage in conversation with A?
It is here that the peculiar nature of the notion of acceptance be-
comes crucial to our argument. We grant that B may not believe that it’s
not true that A accepts that anything goes for A. Nevertheless, for the
purposes of conversation, she must take that for granted. To make an
assertion is not to try to make a demand that the hearer changes her
attitude. Rather, it just is to make a demand to that effect. By making an
assertion, the speaker represents herself as accepting that it’s not true
that anything goes. Hence, she takes that for granted for the purposes of
the conversation.
Three Intermediate Premises. Once we have ðA0Þ, it’s easy to get a further
claim that will be useful. If A is rational, she will see the reasoning ex-
plained above and realize that ðA0Þ is required for communication to
function.39 Hence, she will accept ðA0Þ, which gives us the following
claim:
38. There are modes-of-presentation-kind issues with this formulation. What we want
to say is that B accepts that A accepts that there is a norm that she herself, individuated in
the self-locating way, ought not rule out ðsee John Perry, “The Problem of the Essential
Indexical,” Noûs 13 ½1979: 3–21; David Lewis, “Attitudes De Dicto and De Se,” Philosophical
Review 88 ½1979: 513–43, among manyÞ. These issues are orthogonal to our main concern
here and can be put to the side.
39. Of course, this is not to say that A will have explicit knowledge of ðA0Þ or that
she would be able to report that she accepts ðA0Þ for the purposes of the conversation.
Knowledge and acceptance of the principles discussed in this section may be implicit.
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AccAAccBAccAð∃n Ought ðn ∈ AccAÞÞ: ðA1Þ
Given these two claims, we can establish that each speaker accepts that
there is a norm that she ought not rule out. In symbols, this involves
eliminating two iterations of the ‘Acc’ operator from ðA1Þ:
AccAð∃n Ought ðn ∈ AccAÞÞ: ðA2Þ
To see that, suppose that B accepts that A accepts J, and that A accepts




Now, assume that, despite this, A doesn’t accept J ði.e., :AccAJÞ. Then A
has a choice. She can either point out that she does not accept J, or she
can act as if she accepts it for the purposes of the conversation. If she
goes for the first option, B will stop accepting that A accepts J. If A goes
for the second option, she will actually come to accept J for the pur-
poses of the conversation. ðNotice that here, once more, the particular
nature of acceptance and its divergence from belief is crucial to make
the point.Þ
Now, our claims ðA0Þ and ðA1Þ are just instances of schemas ðiÞ and
ðiiÞ. We established above that ðA0Þ and ðA1Þ hold in any ‘normal’ con-
versation. Hence, in any normal conversation, speakers are faced, at any
point, with the alternatives of denying that they accept that there is a
norm they ought not to rule out or going along with it. If they make the
former choice, then they will essentially opt out of the conversation. In
that case, in fact, ðA0Þ will no longer hold and communication will lose
its point. Hence, if the conversation goes on, then they effectively accept
that there is a norm they ought not rule out.
In symbols, by running the reasoning for both speakers, we get the
following two claims:
AccAð∃n Ought ðn ∈ AccAÞÞ: ðA2Þ
AccBð∃n Ought ðn ∈ AccBÞÞ: ðA3Þ
These say that each participant in a conversation accepts that there is a
norm that she ought not rule out. To get can go wrong from here, we
still have to show that they all accept that there is a unique norm that
they both ought not rule out.
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The Final Step. The argument for this conclusion is not dissimilar from
the argument we gave for ðA0Þ. Suppose that it’s not true that speakers
accept that there is a norm they both ought to accept. For example, sup-
pose that B doesn’t accept that. By the previous argument, we know that
B accepts that there is a norm that she ought not rule out: call that norm
‘n*’. According to B, it might be that A is allowed to rule out n*. This al-
lows for a situation of the following kind. Suppose that A utters a nor-
mative claim: for example, “Tax evasion is wrong.” Now, Bmay accept that
A’s assertion is correct in a number of respects: it is sincere, it doesn’t vi-
olate any constraints on A’s attitudes, and so on. Nevertheless, since B
doesn’t accept that she and her interlocutor are coordinating on the
same norm, she has no reason to assent to A’s assertion. It might be that
the proposition expressed by ‘Tax evasion is wrong’ is okay to accept for
A but not for B ði.e., it might rule out n*, the norm that B ought not rule
outÞ.
In this situation, it is not rational for B to engage in communication
with A. If she did, she would risk being in violation of the normative re-
quirement that she takes herself to be subject to ðvia ½A3Þ. Hence, in
order for B to engage in communication with A, she will accept that
there is a unique norm that both A and B ought not rule out. Of course,
a parallel conclusion holds for A.
We conclude that all speakers involved in conversation will accept
the following claim:
ð∃nÞð∀sÞ Ought ðn ∈ AccsÞ: ðA4Þ
From here, it’s a short step to claim that ðA4Þ has common ground sta-
tus. After all, we did not need any specific assumptions about what speak-
ers happened to accept in order to establish ðA4Þ. Thus, if common belief
in minimal rationality is in place, it will be common belief, at least tac-
itly, that ðA4Þ is accepted by all participants in the conversation. This
gives us exactly can go wrong, which we repeat below:
can go wrong. The following claim is common ground in any
conversation:
ð∃nÞð∀sÞ Ought ðn ∈ AccsÞ:
Summary. It’s time to take stock. We have bootstrapped our way into our
conclusion from a number of intermediate premises. We have claimed,
first, that while engaging in conversation each speaker must assume that
‘not anything goes’ for her interlocutor. From here, we have argued,
exploiting the peculiar public nature of acceptance, that each speaker
must assume that ‘not anything goes’ for her own attitudes as well. Fi-
nally, we have argued that, if speakers have to trust each other, they must
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assume that ‘not anything goes’ for them in the same way—essentially,
that the normative constraints applying to all of their attitudes are the
same.
D. Establishing uniqueness
In order to establish convergence, we need one more claim. This is the
claim that speakers presuppose that their acceptance states ought to be
shrunk to a unique point:
uniqueness. The following claim is common ground in any
conversation:
Oughtðð∃nÞð∀sÞAccs 5 fngÞ:
uniqueness may seem more controversial than it is. At first sight, you
might worry that it enforces a requirement of objectivity that is even
stronger than that posed by can go wrong. But notice the difference in
the scope of the operators. uniqueness doesn’t say that there is a norm
on which acceptances ought to converge; it just says that speakers ought
to converge on some norm or other. Hence, uniqueness amounts to no
more than the claim that, when engaged in conversation, we take for
granted that we ought to agree on one among a number of live alter-
natives ðand that this is common belief between usÞ. But now, at least
given our working picture of conversation, it is a truism that the point of
conversation is to achieve consensus as to which of the live alternatives is
the one we ought to coordinate on. Hence, we take uniqueness to be
uncontroversial.
Once again, it is worth recalling that we are working with small
worlds and small norms. It would be unrealistic to assume that ordinary
speakers take up the task of narrowing open possibilities to a point in
logical space. But we are not making this assumption. On the small worlds
construal, uniqueness just amounts to the requirement that all ques-
tions under discussion receive an answer. This much seems perfectly ac-
ceptable. By raising a question, a speaker seems to demand that partici-
pants in the conversation make a choice between the available answers.
To be sure, speakers normally don’t hold that all uncertainty ought
to be eliminated at any cost. They can opt out of conversation for a num-
ber of reasons—they’re uninterested, or it’s too demanding, or it’s clear
that agreement won’t be reached. But this is compatible with unique-
ness. We are claiming that uniqueness is something that speakers hold
as long as they are engaged in conversation. In other words, as long as
they think that there is a point to engaging in conversation, they must
think that they ought to converge on some live possibility. Converging
on some live possibility is just what the point of conversation is. Speakers
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may give up onuniqueness, but by doing so they give up on the very point
of staying in a conversation.
E. Convergence
We have argued for the following two claims:
can go wrong. The following claim is common ground in any
conversation:
ð∃nÞð∀sÞ Ought ðn ∈ AccsÞ:
uniqueness. The following claim is common ground in any
conversation:
Oughtðð∃nÞð∀sÞAccs 5 fngÞ:
These two claims entail our wanted conclusion:
convergence. In any normal conversation, the following claim
is common ground:
ð∃nÞð∀sÞ Ought ðfng5 AccsÞ:
The step from can go wrong and uniqueness to convergence is
straightforward. can go wrong establishes that there is one norm that
ought not be ruled out from the context set. uniqueness establishes that
the context set ought to be reduced to some norm or other. The only way
to satisfy the two desiderata is that the context set be shrunk exactly to
the one norm that ought not be ruled out.40
F. Convergence and Error Theories
We have argued that the following claim is presupposed in any normal
conversation:
ð∃nÞð∀sÞ Ought ðfng5 AccsÞ:
40. Here is a more detailed proof. Assume, with can go wrong, ð∃nÞð∀sÞ Ought
ðn ∈ AccsÞ. Let n* be such an n; we get that ð∀sÞ Ought ðn* ∈ AccsÞ. Then assume, with
uniqueness, thatOughtðð∃nÞð∀sÞAccs 5 fngÞ. Finally, for reductioassume thatconvergence
fails, i.e., assume that ð∀nÞð∃sÞ May :ðfng5 AccsÞ. Instantiating the last claim with n*, we
get that ð∃sÞ May :ðfn*g5 AccsÞ. Let s* be the relevant speaker: we get May :ðfn*g5
Accs*Þ Given can go wrong, this means that s*’s acceptance state can permissibly be aðproperÞ superset of fn*g. But uniqueness requires that Oughtðð∃nÞAccs* 5 fngÞ, i.e., that
s*’s acceptance state be a singleton. Contradiction.
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Of course, this is not to say that this claim is true. Indeed, it’s not clear
how the question of truth and falsity of normative claims should be han-
dled by the expressivist in the metalanguage.
One consequence of this is worth highlighting. The model of com-
munication that results from our argument doesn’t require any kind of
pretense or error theory. Since the crucial presupposition is normative,
speakers are not required to make an assumption that may be false by the
expressivist’s own lights ðsomething in the ballpark of there being nor-
mative factsÞ to proceed in conversation. The assumption theymustmake
is functionally analogous. But, crucially, it doesn’t commit them to some
false claim about what the world is like.
We take this to be a significant advantage of our proposal. To see
why, let’s compare it briefly with a somewhat similar picture of commu-
nication for nonfactual discourse, proposed by Andy Egan in the con-
text of defending a form of relativism.41 Egan endorses a form of truth
relativism on which the contents of certain assertions—for example,
claims about personal taste—are centered world propositions ði.e., sets
of triples of a world, a time, and an individualÞ. On this picture, the
content of
ð5Þ Eggplants are tasty.
is the set of triples hw, t, i i such that i has ðat t in wÞ the disposition to like
eggplants.42
Since contents are more fine grained than sets of worlds, Egan has a
problem analogous to that of the expressivist. He must explain how as-
sertions of claims about taste work, given that he can’t appeal to the
standard idea of locating an actual point. He does this by imposing a
constraint on the felicity of assertions: asserting a centered-world prop-
osition requires presupposing that all speakers in the conversation are
similar in relevant respects. For example, a felicitous assertion of ð5Þ re-
quires that all speakers presuppose that they’re disposed to have a simi-
lar response of enjoyment or distaste toward eggplants.
This proposal seems to run into trouble rather quickly. After all,
ð5Þ seems assertable even in cases in which it’s entirelymanifest that one’s
audience doesn’t share one’s dispositions ð“What? You don’t like egg-
plants? You’re crazy! Eggplants are just so tasty!”Þ.43 An account that re-
41. Andy Egan, “Epistemic Modals, Relativism and Assertion,” Philosophical Studies 133
ð2007Þ: 1–22, and “Disputing about Taste,” in Disagreement, ed. Ted A. Warfield and Rich-
ard Feldman ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2010Þ, 247–86.
42. Egan, “Disputing about Taste,” 259ff.
43. Note that this worry is different from that of whether disputes over ð5Þ are ever
worthwhile. Egan rightly points out that one can bemistaken about whether one is disposed
to enjoy eggplants. Suppose that Alice utters ð5Þ, and Barbara utters its negation. On Egan’s
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quires a factual presupposition of similarity to be in place is hard-pressed
to explain cases like this, since this presupposition flatly contradicts
information that is built into the context set.44
To be sure, this does not show that there is no account in terms of a
presupposition of similarity that could be made to work.45 But even if
such an account could yield the right predictions, we are still being
forced to make controversial assumptions about the level of conceptual
sophistication one would need in order to believe that eggplants are
tasty. In contrast, our model has no problems with cases like this. On our
model, just engaging in conversation is enough to bring about the pre-
supposition that there ought to be a point of convergence between speak-
ers. While it might be evident that convergence is hard to achieve in some
cases, this doesn’t contradict other bits of common ground information.
V. CONCLUSION
Expressivism about normative discourse runs into a problem about com-
munication. The expressivist wants to see communication as a form of
coordination in attitudes among speakers. But it is not clear how the
expressivist can explain why the communication of normative claims
takes the form that it does. The descriptivist model of communication
makes an obvious appeal to truth, and it’s unclear how the expressivist
can do without it.
We argued that, just by assuming certain basic facts about commu-
nication and the rationality of the speakers, we can answer this challenge.
The expressivist can think of normative conversation as a joint attempt
at ruling out possibilities—much like the descriptivist does—where these
are systems of norms that are complete with regard to all questions un-
der discussion. The similarity between normative and nonnormative
view, Alice can take Barbara to have been sincere while still thinking she is wrong—after all,
it might be that Barbara is mistaken about her own disposition to enjoy eggplants. Our
point is that, on Egan’s picture, Alice cannot explicitly recognize that Barbara lacks that
disposition and continue to insist that eggplants really are tasty. Thanks to an anonymous
referee for pushing us to clarify this point.
44. As Lewis, “Scorekeeping in a Language Game,” points out, it is customary to
bring about a presupposition in the context set by making an assertion that requires it.
This is the so-called phenomenon of presupposition accommodation. Note however that, in
this case, the presupposition could not just be added to the context set, for it contradicts
other information that is already in the context set. While there may be cases in which a
speaker triggers accommodation of information that conflicts with the context set, it
seems odd to utter in one breath two sentences, one of which presupposes something that
is incompatible with the other. On Egan’s picture, an utterance of “I see you do not like
eggplants, but they really are tasty” would be like an utterance of “There is no King of
France, but the King of France is bald.” Thanks here to an anonymous referee.
45. For a different proposal, see Egan, “Disputing about Taste,” 270–71.
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conversation is due to the fact that, when engaging in normative con-
versation—at least insofar as these are adequately modeled in a broadly
Stalnakerian picture—speakers need to assume that there is a unique
system of norms on which their attitudes ought to converge. This as-
sumption works as the normative counterpart of the presupposition that
there is an actual world that speakers are trying to locate in conversation.
Let us close with some more speculative remarks. The problem of
explaining how communication works is part of a more general problem
for the expressivist, that is, the problem of accounting for the apparent
objectivity of moral thought and talk. It’s a vexed question exactly what
‘objectivity’ means in this context.46 Following Gibbard, let’s just say that
there is a sense in which, by making a normative statement, a speaker
seems to be claiming an authority of some sort. She’s not merely making
a suggestion as to how conversational participants could achieve coor-
dination. Rather, she’s claiming that her opinion is right in a stronger,
intersubjective sense.47 One major issue for the expressivist is doing jus-
tice to this idea.
Our conclusions in this article are certainly not enough to address
this issue. But we think we have taken some steps in the right direction. If
our argument is sound, we’ve shown that engaging with anyone’s nor-
mative claims requires assuming the existence of a kind of intersubjec-
tive normative standard. Part of what it is to engage in normative con-
versation with an agent is to take her claims to apply some pressure on
one’s own normative views. This pressure comes not from a factual as-
sumption of a common normative outlook but rather from the norma-
tive structure of conversation itself.
What we have not shown, of course, is how this kind of intersub-
jectivity can stretch beyond the boundaries of conversations. For exam-
ple, our account is silent on why Anne and Zoe, who have never met face
to face and never been in a conversation together, should take them-
selves to be subjected to the same normative standard. For all we know,
nothing that we’ve said helps answer this question. But our general
strategy—of deriving a kind of objectivity from the structure of our social
practices—might be worth exploring as a way of producing a more
general vindication of objectivity on behalf of the expressivist.
46. See, e.g., Gideon Rosen, “Objectivity andModern Idealism:What Is theQuestion?” in
Philosophy in Mind, ed. Michaelis Michael and John O’Leary-Hawthorne ðDordrecht: Kluwer,
1994Þ, 277–319.
47. Compare Gibbard, Wise Choices, 155.
Pérez Carballo and Santorio Communication for Expressivists 635
This content downloaded from 129.011.023.082 on April 21, 2016 01:45:42 AM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
